Humanitarian Assistance Projects for North Korea
— status and development proposal

Kang Young-Sik (Secretary General, Korean Sharing Movement)

1. Introduction

○ Humanitarian aids to North Korea basically aim to help North Korean people survive the crisis of the fundamental right to life, enhance their quality of life in a sustainable way, and guarantee them human dignity. Importantly, humanitarian support and civilian exchanges for North Korea is the foundation for expanding exchange & cooperation between the two Koreas, enhancing peace in the Korean peninsula and preparing peaceful reunification in the future. For this reason, humanitarian aid to North Korea should be carried out consistently and independently with as little influence as possible from politics between the South and North Koreas.

○ Over recent years, however, humanitarian aids to North Korea have been very uncertain and vulnerable to political circumstances. Humanitarian principles have been seriously impaired, and then South–North contact has decreased, to such an extent that, as we directly witnessed, communication came to an end, in the midst of exacerbated prejudices and distortions about each other. This in turn created a vicious cycle of conflicts occurring within the society of South Korea.

○ The crux of the problem is this: how we can create a virtuous, not vicious, cycle, by coordinating these three considerations — improved South–North relation, humanitarian aids, and civilian exchanges. To this
end, first of all, we need to establish a social consensus regarding basic principles and methods of humanitarian work in North Korea. Then, regardless of regime change or political situation, or even changes in the Government's policy for North Korea, we need to ensure that North Korea humanitarian aid is conducted with consistency and stability. Now the early Moon Jae-in government is a moment as such.

2. Status of Humanitarian Aid to North Korea

1) Problem of the Park Geun-hye Government's policies on aiding North Korea and civilian exchanges

○ Undermine humanitarian principles and unilaterally regulate civil groups' humanitarian aid for North Korea

- The Park Government proclaimed that 'it will continue humanitarian aid to North Korea irrespective of political or military situation.' In reality, however, the Government failed to dissociate humanitarian aid from the South-North political relations, and even employed the aid agenda as a political strategy to build up pressure on North Korea.

- On January 6 last year, immediately after the North's 4th nuclear test, the Ministry of Unification outrightly shut out civil groups' aid efforts. In fact, according to UN Security Council Resolution 2270 on the North Korean Economy, the following is explicitly stated: 'no negative influence at all should be exerted upon any international organizations' or NGOs' aid work for North Korean residents.' The Park Government at that time, however, implemented a complete discontinuation policy of any civilian-based aid efforts to North Korea. The Government disallowed a civilian-based aid organization from making any attempt to visit North Korea, let alone providing basic living necessities. The Government even refused to accept humanitarian aid groups' basic normal requests, such as "reporting to the government before contacting any North Korean resident."

○ The last Park government went on to disallow even emergency relief support for the most vulnerable in North Korea, which at least had been pursued in the earlier Lee Myung-bak Government.
In September 2016, for instance, the Park Government disallowed civil organizations' support to North Korea at the time of Hamgyong Floods in North Korea. The government overreacted and then too much interfered with indirect supportive efforts from international organizations and overseas Korean groups, even if there were no legal problems involved. Under this outright disapproval policy from the Ministry of Unification, humanitarian aid organizations had to give up their direct aid approach and instead pursued an indirect way of supporting North Korea through International Federation of Red Cross (IRFC) or overseas Korean organizations.

The last Park Government took the policy of not just severely restricting civilian efforts of humanitarian aid; it further implemented the policy of excluding all civilian aid attempts.

In March 2014, in Dresden Doctrine, Park proposed to help pregnant mothers and infants in the North (1,000 days) and indeed allowed support from international organizations, but ironically restricted support from civilian groups.

In 2015, the Park Government resumed in four years the South–North Cooperation Fund's funding to civil organizations. Some of such funding was indeed implemented, but the Government, applying a double standard, disapproved projects that civilian groups proposed to pursue independently without funding from government.

In 2016, the total amount of civil organizations' aid to the North was 2.8 billion won, out of which 2.6 billion won actually corresponded to the North Korea tuberculosis relief by Eugene Bell Foundation, a global NGO. At that time, the Ministry of Unification disapproved civil organizations' aid efforts, while announcing that 'it will approve an international NGO sending Korean goods to North Korea.'

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<th>표 1</th>
<th>한국정부와 민간단체의 인도적 대북지원 현황 (1999년~2016년)</th>
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2) The Moon Jae-in Government's Humanitarian Aid to the North

○ In the Moon Jae-in administration, since the end of May this year, the Ministry of Unification has officially started to allow civil organizations to make a contact with the North, issuing a guideline that "as long as they do not undermine the International Community's sanctions against North Korea, the government will respond to North-South civilian exchanges with much flexibility."

○ Yet in early June, the North refused to resume assistance projects, saying this: "we agree that to resume civilian cooperation and exchanges is necessary for revitalizing the North-South relation. At present, however, this is not likely, because the new South Government is working in favor of the UN sanctions against the North." As a result, civilian groups' humanitarian aid to the North, although having been much desired by people for such a long time, still remains suspended now.

○ The following is an excerpt from President Moon Jae-in’s speech, "A New Vision of Peace in the Korean Peninsula" (speech at the Körber Foundation, Germany, July 7)

- "When it comes to non-political exchanges and cooperative projects, the Government is determined to promote them consistently, irrespective of political or military circumstances. ... If South and North Koreas actively engage with exchanges & cooperative projects, it will be like

| 구분 | 99 | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|      | 652 | 2,422 | 1,757 | 8,226 | 8,373 | 6,330 | 3,926 | 2,982 | 4,397 | 4,163 | 671 | 604 | 196 | 161 | 183 | 185 | 254 | 29 |
| 정부 차원 | 당국차원 | 339 | 978 | 975 | 1,140 | 1,097 | 1,313 | 1,340 | 2,273 | 1,983 | 438 | 294 | 204 | 65 | 25 | 133 | 141 | 140 | 1 |
| 민간자원 | 통한 지원 | 34 | 62 | 65 | 81 | 102 | 120 | 134 | 216 | 241 | 77 | 21 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 국가차원 | 국제기구를 통한 지원 | - | - | 229 | 243 | 208 | 262 | 19 | 189 | 385 | 197 | 217 | - | 65 | 25 | 133 | 141 | 116 | - |
|           | 계 | 339 | 978 | 975 | 1,140 | 1,097 | 1,313 | 1,340 | 2,273 | 1,983 | 438 | 294 | 204 | 65 | 25 | 133 | 141 | 140 | 1 |
|           | 식량(사회)자원 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|           | 계 | 339 | 978 | 975 | 2,550 | 2,607 | 2,672 | 3,147 | 2,273 | 5,488 | 638 | 294 | 204 | 65 | 25 | 133 | 141 | 140 | 1 |
| 민간자원(무상) | 223 | 387 | 782 | 876 | 966 | 1,580 | 779 | 709 | 909 | 725 | 377 | 200 | 131 | 118 | 81 | 54 | 114 | 28 |
| 총액 | 562 | 2,422 | 1,757 | 8,226 | 8,373 | 6,330 | 3,926 | 2,982 | 4,397 | 4,163 | 671 | 604 | 196 | 161 | 183 | 185 | 254 | 29 |
healing wound, inspiring reconciliation to all members of the Korean peninsula, and building peace from within. ... Exchanges in the private sector have contributed to easing tensions and restoring homogeneity between the two Koreas, more than governmental exchanges have. Expanding civilian exchanges gives a precious opportunity to untie the tight knot between the South and the North. My Government will support a wide range of civilian exchanges in various areas."

○ The following is an excerpt from the keynote address by Unification Minister, Cho Myong-gyon, at '2017 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK" (August 29)

- Humanitarian and brotherhood-based assistance to the North helped improve humanitarian situation of the North Korean people, and enhance their self-reliance and capacity. Humanitarian assistance also played an important role in easing inter-Korean tension and facilitating peace in the Korean peninsula. Now the North Korean nuclear threat has become a serious threat. Nevertheless, the international community, abiding by humanitarian principles, still continues its assistance to the North. Contrary to this, in the Korean peninsula, assistance to the North remains restricted and left sensitive to the inter-Korean political relations. The aid has come to a stop for now. This is a shameful pain.
- The Government will continue to promote non-political exchanges and cooperation between the South and North Korean residents, separating humanitarian issues from political and military circumstances, guaranteeing civilian aid to the North its autonomy, and supporting international organizations in conducting assistance projects for the North.
- The Government will seek to provide the kind of support and cooperation that will reflect changes occurring within North Korea, benefiting both South and North, and of much practical benefit to the North residents. The Government will provide and expand humanitarian aids to the most vulnerable groups in North Korea. In particular, improved nutrition for babies and toddlers is of urgent importance, not only for humanitarian purpose, but also for the future of the Korean peninsula.
Furthermore, we will implement development & cooperation projects. In the past, South and North Korean private & governmental sectors had co-worked for North Korea rural development and forestry cooperation. Furthermore, the South and North Government authorities had reached an agreement, developing healthcare system in North Korea. Reviving these earlier experiences, we should continue a sustainable cooperation between the South and North Koreas and further expand it, enhancing the North's capacity for self-reliance.

3. Humanitarian Aid to North Korea – Significance and Limits

○ South Korea's private sector started its aid to North Korea in the mid 1990s, following the serious North Korean famine, also known as the Arduous March in North Korea. Initially, aid was primarily in the form of an emergency relief and was conducted in a piecemeal and fragmentary fashion. With the advent of the Kim Dae Jung Government and its inter-Korean summits, South-North relations drastically improved towards reconciliation and cooperation, and a dramatic progress followed in quantity and quality for humanitarian aid. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, civil groups were more actively engaged in humanitarian aids to North Korea. In the Lee Myung Bak Administration and due to its tough stance against North Korea, civil groups' humanitarian support had to shrink much. In sum, humanitarian aids for the past 20 years were somehow limited, but played a significant role of being a momentum for turning around inter-Korean relations.

○ In this vein, we discuss some implications of humanitarian aids to North Korea, summarized below in four ways.

First, humanitarian aids to North Korea were the first civilian attempt to contact ever made between South and North Koreas after the division of Korea. Humanitarian help then induced civil society to participate more at the forefront in matters of South-North relations.

Second, civil society has played a central role in humanitarian aids.
Yet humanitarian aids to North Korea, given the governmental nature of inter-Korean ties, are expected to contain properties of private and governmental governance alike. With this character, there naturally emerged a kind of comprehensive system of governance, where central government, local government, civil society, and related corporations were all engaged.

Third, unlike many South-North exchanges which ended up as a one-off event, humanitarian aids to North Korea continued, broadening the form and range of the exchanges.

Fourth, it was the thought of civil organizations which were the axis of the humanitarian aid work that achieving the goal of improving the well-being of the North Korean people was part of reunification process. Civil organizations thus advanced their humanitarian work with a focus on practical dimension rather than on ideological or political aspect, differentiating themselves from earlier unification movement organizations.

As it turned out, humanitarian aids to North Korea, despite their meaningful achievements, had limitations in some aspects. First, aid work was inevitably placed under heavy influence of the South-North relations, and political intervention posed a difficulty in implementing long-term and systematic projects. Second, South Korea's economic and social condition is not yet fully stable enough to be able to maintain a continued support for North Korea. As the "Giveaways" criticism suggests, South Korea has not reached social consensus regarding the necessity of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Third, civil organizations, as they assume a pivotal role in aid work, need to strengthen their capacity, for instance, by expanding related field experts. They need a much more sophisticated system of coordinating international support and aid operations.

4. Development Plan for Humanitarian Aid to North Korea
1) One needs to normalize humanitarian aid to North Korea. To do so, above all, the government should eliminate a range of existing regulatory
measures, which are severely deterring humanitarian work by civil organizations and local government. The government needs to ensure that civil groups and local governments assume full autonomy and responsibility for providing aid to North Korea.

2) Second, the government needs to change the way it perceives humanitarian aids to North Korea. South-North relation is by nature political, so humanitarian agenda was unfortunately looked on as a mere political strategy. Previous governments took exactly this stance: humanitarian aid was not considered as a purpose. Rather, humanitarian aid was taken as a means or tool to bring certain external outcomes: for instance, food provision in exchange for external goals like signing negotiations with North Korea, or having a dialogue between the two authorities, or holding a reunion of separated families. Humanitarian aid issues were not completely separated from political agenda. The general public, by contrast, regarded food provision to North Korea as South Korea's moral obligation for a humanitarian purpose. In addition, there was a growing public sentiment demanding that the government’s aid to North Korea should not be approved unless its distributive transparency is fully guaranteed. Now, a challenge for us is that we need to create a virtuous cycle of these two elements, improving South-North relation and ensuring government’s humanitarian aid to North Korea.

3) Third, one needs to ensure that aid to North Korea is carried out in a sustainable and stable way. To do so, a legal requirement is necessary, such as a social contract or legalization. We first can reach a social agreement about assistance to North Korea, and then have the agreement legalized. Then, aid organizations will be able to continue to carry out their humanitarian work, development and cooperation projects. In September 2016, North Korean Human Rights Act came into effect. What it means is that humanitarian aid to North Korea should be bound by the Human Rights Act. Unfortunately, this kind of measure confuses human rights with humanitarian aid. The confusion, open to political misinterpretation, could result in a violation of the principle of humanitarianism. We definitely need a legal and social enforcement to the
following effect that aid to North Korea is only for humanitarian purpose. This law will enable consistent policy implementation. Also, we need another legislation to the effect that aid to North Korea is a long-term project to be continued until peaceful unification is fulfilled. With this law, one is obliged to pursue the long-term goal of unification when making policy proposals, objectives and strategies.

4) Fourth, for the future aid work, along with a short-term humanitarian aid, a mid-term and long-term development & cooperation projects should be promoted in an integrated way. In particular, bridging the gap between South and North Koreas, we desperately need to plan a mid-term and long-term development & cooperation projects under the public-private partnership. Responding to a short-term humanitarian need is important, but we need to make a long-term strategy to profoundly enhance humanitarian situation of North Korea. The best way to do so is by fundamentally upgrading North Korea's development capacity itself. In North Korea, a range of meaningful areas are waiting for development & cooperation: agriculture, stockbreeding, healthcare system, nutrition, forestation, infrastructure, infants and toddlers. In promoting and expanding development & cooperation in North Korea, a comprehensive and integrative approach is required. To do so, we need to set up a permanent organization which operates under the public-private partnership and engages related vocational groups and various experts.

Also, for mid-term and long-term development & cooperation, a certain international standard may be drawn upon. In doing so, North Korea should be encouraged to exert its own leadership in designing and implementing North Korea development strategies, while their broad direction and priorities are laid out according to international standards.

5) Fifth, it is important to restore private and public partnership. The currently dysfunctional system of private and public partnership must be restored in order to resolve humanitarian crisis in North Korea, to revitalize humanitarian aid, and to create strong aspirations for
South-North integration. A government-dominant and one-way approach to unification lacks transparency in terms of its purpose, and could inhibit a free debate and diverse opinions on unification among private sectors. The same principle applies to the issue of humanitarian assistance to North Korea. An official procedure and format is necessary to help ensure its transparent implementation, thus getting out of the "Giveaways" controversy and reaching national consensus and easing social conflicts. The process described is important when the government pursues any policy for North Korea. This is why rebuilding private and public partnership governance becomes crucial.

5. Proposal of How to Cooperate with International Community

1) ‘2030’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
   - UN’s Development aspirations to be promoted by the international community for the next 15 years, 2016–2030, '  
   - Consist of 17 proposed sustainable development goals and 169 targets, and even set indicators of the goal accomplished.
   - Participation of North Korea
     - North Korea responded: '2030 Sustainable Development Agenda' is humanity's common action principles, a pledge of eradicating social injustice and poverty worldwide, fully nurturing human dignity and creativity, and constructing the world which guarantees prosperous life for next generations as well as current generation."

2) UN Strategic Plans for UN–North Korea Cooperation <For 2017–2011 Sustainable and Restorative Human Development>
   - UN Country Team residing in North Korea sets up business projects with North Korea every 5 years
   - In September 1, 2016, UN Country team residing in North Korea (14 organizations) signed an agreement with North Korea’s National Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Towards "Sustainable and Resilient Human Development"

This 'UN Strategic Framework 2017–2021 (UNSF)' sets out the agreed priorities for the UN's work in DPR Korea over the 5-year period 2017–2021. It replaces the previous framework, which covered the period 2011–2016. It has been agreed and co-signed by both the Government and the UN's Country Team, led by the Resident Coordinator. All parties have committed to implementing the provisions of the Strategic Framework in good faith.

The objective of the UN's work in DPR Korea is to support and reinforce national efforts to improve the well-being of the people, paying particular attention to the most vulnerable groups. The UNSF should be viewed as a framework to guide the UN's work, not as a program as such: more detailed programs will be formulated by the individual agencies of the United Nations system, especially those resident in the country. The Framework should also be seen as an agreement between the UN and the Government on what should be done through joint efforts: ability to implement will depend on support from both the Government and the international community.

The essence of the UN’s work in the DPRK is not principally about resource transfer but about sharing and transferring international principles and values, standards and know-how. The Strategic Framework has therefore applied a generic six part model of the UN's country-level work to the DPR Korean context. It embodies a comprehensive view of the UN’s work in the country, encompassing the work of both resident UN agencies as well as non-resident specialized agencies, and it adopts a holistic approach, integrating humanitarian considerations with longer term development. In this it takes the view that, while short-term humanitarian needs should always be addressed, the best long-term strategy for reducing such need, i.e. increasing the resilience of the population, is to strengthen national development capacity. Bearing all these considerations in mind, the UNSF identifies four strategic priorities, which the UN will seek to address at the country level, working in support of Government programs:

1. Food and Nutrition Security
2. Social Development Services
3. Resilience and Sustainability
4. Data and Development Management
In addressing these four strategic priorities in collaboration with the Government, the UN will apply a number of cross-cutting approaches throughout its work: it will seek to localize the new Sustainable Development Goals, to accord with the specific situation in DPR Korea; it will apply a human rights-based approach, which puts people at the centre, throughout its programmes; it will support the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of women; it will pursue both environmental sustainability as well as institutional sustainability; it will seek to increase the resilience of the people of DPR Korea; and it will do all this with an attention to results-based management and achieving value for money. This is why the overall, uniting theme of this Strategic Framework is "sustainable and resilient human development".

3) Aid to North Korea in conjunction with International Community

○ In September 21, our Government decided to resume funding support to WF and UNICEF amounting to $8 million. This funding pledge remains unfulfilled yet, and there still exists a strong opposition to this decision. This shows that, at this moment of extreme confrontation, government's decision as such may throw an unintended confusion to the international community.

○ Humanitarian aid to North Korea began in the mid-90's. Until recent days, our government has continued its aid activity to North Korea through multiple channels of international community (international organizations). To describe a bit of background to this approach, Korea so far has actively engaged with international organizations, and now enjoys heightened status in the international community. This places an increased demand for Korea's financial share in the international community.

○ For another reason, relations have strained between South and North, and, on the part of the government or civil organization, their approach of directly supporting North Korea has become implausible. Public opinion on aid to North Korea even worsened. These are why support via the channels of international organizations has increased.

  - The policy of direct aid to North Korea, previously promoted by the two earlier Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moon-hyun administrations, was
repealed in the Lee Myung-bak administration, which stayed negative to aids to North Korea. The Lee administration instead pursued aid through international organizations.

− The following Park Geun-hye administration, after her Dresden Proclamation in March 2014, completely gave up the direct aid method. The Park administration instead actively encouraged a detour or indirect aid approach via international organizations, such as global NGOs and Korean diaspora.

○ Humanitarian aid via international organizations has had some problems: it was influenced by South–North political and military situation, and was concentrated much to a few organizations like WFP, WHO, UNICEF. Despite these limits, humanitarian aid via international organizations played a crucial role. It was the only humanitarian channel at work back when the Korean government and civil organizations had to stay not fully committed to humanitarian aid. Without this international channel, we would not have been able to contribute to bettering the lives of the vulnerable in North Korea.

○ Since the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in government, the inter–Korean relations have seriously strained. South and North currently seem not likely to resume direct exchanges and humanitarian aid any time soon. In this situation, the Government and expert groups may consider providing aid to North Korea via cooperation with the international community. The indirect method is perceived not as an alternative to the industry between the South and North Koreas, but as a complementary strategy needed to facilitate the South–Korea industry. The process requires a thorough evaluation and preparation.

○ A civil organization, if it seeks to promote humanitarian aids via the international community, may try a different strategy of doing so other than what the present Government currently adopts.

− A simple approach is not desired such that a civil organization provides fund to international organizations or NGOs and later gets informed of funding outcomes. A better approach would be to create an interactive
model of implementing business in a cooperative way, where both counterparts jointly engage in the entire processes of business, including planning, implementation, evaluation, etc.

- International organizations under UN normally operates based on their own specialized systems; each has its own institutionalized system of support provision, fund administration, complex decision-making, long-term support plans, and others. This distinct operation system may pose a difficulty when our civil organizations attempt to develop a mutually interactive way of cooperating with international organizations over the aid agenda.

- Over recent years, an indirect aid was tried many times through Korean diaspora. Their achievement, however, turned out not so remarkable as compared to what our Government and civil organizations have achieved so far.

○ We need to find out an international organization as an appropriate partner. To do so, we may assess each international organization for these factors: field of enterprise, business engagement with North Korea, and long-term support projects. The two parties then discover a kind of humanitarian assistance project that can benefit both participants.

- In addition to providing material support to North Korea, non-material projects are also worthy of consideration, such as reinforcing capacity of North Korean workforce or sharing knowledge.

- Most importantly, humanitarian aids to North Korea in conjunction with international NGOs should not remain a single time project. It cannot be deemed a temporary measure, i.e., a kind of interim measure to be taken only when direct exchanges are not realistically possible between South and North, readily returning to direct exchanges when available again. Rather, this multilateral project is a profoundly useful approach, promoted in close partnership among the three counterparts of civil organizations, international NGOs and North Korea. It surely deserves a mid-term and long-term consideration.

○ So far, a variety of agencies have engaged with humanitarian support:
international NGOs, Korean diaspora organizations, the Government and civil organizations. These agencies' approaches were varying and too individual. From now on, we need to have more communication and interaction among the participants of North Korea humanitarian projects, and develop more meaningful projects of joint cooperation.

- This experimental approach described can provide us with a valuable advance learning, in areas such as emergency aid, direction of social development, cooperation, and role division between civil organizations and the international community. It thus prepares us for future challenges of developing a larger-scale exchange & development tasks with North Korea once North Korea gets ready for a full-scale development.

6. Conclusion

○ The following is a message sent by Erich Weingartner, a Canadian, who in 1997 had resided and worked in Pyongyang as the head of the liaison office of the UN food aid agencies. The message was included in the 20-year-period white paper published in celebration of its 20th anniversary, <Korean Sharing Movement.>

"... Sharing is not unilateral. When we share something with others, the thing shared belongs to the giver and the receiver both. Sharing resources means that people possess the items in common. ... Sharing not just occurs within the community: sharing is a characterizing feature of the community itself. A community without any sharing would be like abandoning the character of the community. Refusal to sharing is evidence that the community was divided. DMZ, which has been cutting through the Korean peninsula for more than 60 years, has been a barrier for South-North sharing & 'helping each other.' In this regard, DMZ itself represents a symbol of the disrupted Korean peninsula. ... The biggest challenge facing the Korean peninsula is reconciliation. Reconciliation is heart-to-heart sharing of not just resources, but also of pain, sorrow, yearning and hope. This will be the first step toward reconciliation."
According to Weingartner, DMZ, which divides the Korean peninsula, was initially aimed at preventing another breakout of war: yet, at the same time, it represents an obstacle, which has blocked South-North sharing & 'helping each other.' The biggest challenge for the Korean peninsula is reconciliation. Reconciliation is opening and sharing, not just of resources but also of pain, suffering, yearning and hope. This will be the first step toward reconciliation,' said Weingartner.

For the past years, we keenly realized one fact: although we try much to stick to humanitarian principles, aid to North Korea could not be completely free from domestic political situation, always left vulnerable to the variable character of the South-North relations. For the past 20 years, civil aid to North Korea has suffered repeated vulnerability, struggle and stagnation under the framework of the government's North Korea policy. Given the reality where the Government almost controls South-North relation and North Korea policies, it is now time to consider how civil organizations are enabled to obtain their free and autonomous capacity in managing their aid work for North Korea.

In addition, to help North Korea aid projects get on the full-scale track, civil society should play a leading role, by trying to place politics within a larger context of humanitarianism and brotherhood. As President Moon Jae-in proclaimed, one's thinking should extend far enough to cross over DMZ, Abrok River and Duman River. Also, the breadth of a man should go far and wide enough to encompass all areas from the southern tip of the Korean peninsula up to North Korean people. The breadth of one's ideology, never being confined to liberal or conservative side, should expand into a new big idea for prosperity in the Korean peninsula.

However difficult the situation may look, helping North Korean brothers is the responsibility of South Korean people. Future humanitarian aid to North Korea should progress further, beyond improving humanitarian situation of North Korean people. Cooperative projects between the two Koreas, with their careful planning and implementation, should be able to contribute to resolving inter-Korean conflicts, enhancing peaceful
co-existence, and ultimately facilitating a comprehensive peace. We hope that humanitarian aids to North Korea will become priming water for 'peaceful Korea.'